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Giving Power to the People: Comparing the
Environmental Provisions of Chile’s Free Trade Agreements with
Canada and the United States
by Rachel T. Kirby*
“Trade, of course, is neither inherently good nor bad; but
how it is conducted in the future is now a matter of deep concern—and unprecedented opportunity.”1

IV concludes that free trade agreements offer an avenue for
increased enforcement of environmental laws, and that citizen
enforcement procedures strengthen those agreements.

Introduction

Background

S

ixteen years ago, a new U.S. President offered an opportunity to increase North American environmental protection with an environmental side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) that gave citizens
a voice in enforcing environmental laws.2 The side agreement,
known as the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (“NAAEC”), provides a mechanism for citizens
to aim the international spotlight on a government’s failure to
enforce domestic environmental laws.3 A similar agreement
between Chile and Canada, the Canada-Chile Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (“CCAEC”), allows ordinary citizens to ask an international body to investigate alleged nonenforcement of environmental
laws.4 While these mechanisms
are commonplace in a number
of international trade agreements, the U.S.-Chile Free
Trade Agreement (“USCFTA”)
includes a state-to-state dispute
resolution mechanism, but does
not allow for citizen submissions
on enforcement.5
As the international community turns its attention to
environmental crises around
the world, the United States
must decide how to address lax
enforcement of environmental
laws by its trading partners.6 While
a free trade agreement is only one avenue for the United States
and environmental activists to pursue more effective enforcement of every country’s environmental laws, this article argues
that a citizen enforcement mechanism is a vital tool that must be
included in future agreements. Part I outlines the enforcement
mechanisms under the CCAEC, NAAEC, and the USCFTA.
Part II argues that agreements without citizen enforcement
mechanisms cannot effectively increase environmental enforcement, while agreements with these provisions encourage interest
in environmental issues and pressure to strengthen environmental regulations. Part III recommends including citizen enforcement mechanisms in future U.S. trade agreements. Finally, Part

CCAEC & NAAEC Citizen Enforcement
Procedures
The CCAEC and NAAEC address ineffective enforcement
of domestic environmental laws in two ways. The first is a stateto-state dispute resolution mechanism for a persistent failure
to enforce a party’s own environmental laws in a manner that
interferes with free trade.7 The second is a citizen submission on
enforcement procedure.8 This mechanism allows any citizen to
send a submission to either National Secretariat asserting that a
party to the CCAEC or NAAEC is “failing to effectively enforce
its environmental law.”9
The CCAEC established a
Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (“CEC”) made up
of a Council, a Joint Submission
Committee, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.10 A
citizen submission to the CEC
must meet seven largely procedural criteria and be grounded
in a specific incident of nonenforcement.11 The Joint Submission Committee decides
whether the submission merits
a response from the state, then
decides whether to produce a
public factual record.12 While
the intent of the factual record is
to describe and report events without passing judgment on parties’ actions, parties still resist the process.13

The United States must
decide how to address
lax enforcement of
environmental laws by its
trading partners.
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USCFTA Environmental State-to-State Dispute
Resolution Procedures
Like the CCAEC and NAAEC, the USCFTA obliges both
parties to “effectively enforce” domestic environmental laws.14
The process can only begin if a party has persistently failed to
effectively enforce its environmental laws “in a manner affecting
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trade between the Parties.”15 Under the CCAEC, a citizen can
pursue an enforcement matter for a single failure to effectively
enforce an environmental law.16 The dispute settlement provisions of the USCFTA, however, are strictly between government
parties, and require both a persistent pattern of non-enforcement
and a showing that the failure affects trade between the parties.17
Parties first address disputes under the environmental provisions of the USCFTA with consultations.18 If consultations fail
to resolve the matter within sixty days, the complaining party
can initiate the USCFTA dispute resolution procedures.19 First,
the parties convene a meeting
of the Commission to resolve
the issue.20 Next, the parties
convene an arbitral panel if the
issue remains unresolved.21 The
panel can impose fines of up to
fifteen million dollars per day on
the non-enforcing party.22 The
complaining party can suspend
USCFTA trade benefits if the
party fails to pay the fine.23

State Espousal Mechanisms Lead to Mutual NonEnforcement
Both states in a free trade agreement have non-environmental reasons to sign an agreement.32 As a result, environmental
disputes are unlikely because each state has an interest in not
enforcing environmental provisions of the treaty.33 A citizen
alleging that her government has failed to enforce environmental laws has little control over the diplomatic concerns of either
government party to the treaty.34 Because environmental issues
are not a priority, neither party has
an interest in enforcing environmental treaty provisions. At the
same time, the consequences
of state-to-state dispute resolution are trade sanctions, which
undermine the purpose of the
agreement: free trade.35 As a
result, no party has used the
NAAEC or CCAEC government arbitration provisions or
the USCFTA state-to-state dispute resolution procedures.36

No state party has used
the state-to-state dispute
resolution procedures

Analysis
Effective Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Protect the Environment, Human Health, and
Foreign Investment Streams
Environmental laws do not enforce themselves; governments or private citizens must enforce those laws.24 The importance of enforcement is especially true in Latin America, where
many countries have an inconsistent historical relationship with
the rule of law.25 Effective environmental protection requires
both effective environmental laws and consistent enforcement
of those laws.26
Foreign and domestic investors are unlikely to comply with
environmental laws if there are no consequences for violations.
Because environmental compliance can be expensive, companies and investors that violate environmental regulations gain a
competitive advantage against those who do comply. Effective
enforcement reassures investors that competitors are not gaining a competitive advantage by avoiding environmental compliance.27 Overall, trade and investment that leads to increased
prosperity may strengthen effective environmental protections,
but the government or citizens must enforce those protections.28

State-to-State Dispute Resolution Alone Does
Not Increase Enforcement of Environmental Laws
While state-to-state dispute resolution theoretically provides a venue for environmental advocates to work though their
governments, government action carries burdens that make
action unlikely.29 States have neither the capacity nor authority
to effectively monitor enforcement of another state’s environmental laws.30 The absence of a citizen enforcement mechanism
and the requirement that the disputed pattern of non-enforcement affect trade between the parties hampers efforts to improve
environmental protection through treaty provisions.31
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High Burdens of Proof Make an Unused Procedure More
Difficult
The USCFTA provides a dispute resolution mechanism for
state parties to pursue trade sanctions.37 A state party must show
that there is a persistent pattern of non-enforcement and that
the pattern affects trade between Chile and the United States.38
These hurdles to successful sanctions are high even if a state had
an incentive to pursue a dispute.39
The state must first show that there was a persistent pattern
of non-enforcement.40 Effective enforcement requires consistency to be effective, but enforcement in Latin America is more
likely to be inconsistent, precluding proof of a consistent pattern.41 Second, a state must show that the pattern of non-enforcement affected trade between the countries.42 For example, the
state could show that non-enforcement gives domestic facilities
in the complained-against country an advantage over facilities in
the complaining country.43 In a complex global economy, a state
is unlikely to be able to prove a specific impact on trade between
the parties.44 These high burdens of proof substantially limit the
already unlikely state-to-state dispute resolution procedure.

A Citizen Enforcement Procedure is a Better
Mechanism for Increasing Enforcement of
Environmental Laws and Promoting Public
Interest in the Environment
A citizen enforcement mechanism strikes a balance between
state sovereignty and the public desire for a cleaner environment.45 Because citizen submissions do not rely on government
action, countries cannot subsume environmental issues to other
diplomatic concerns.46 Enforcement of domestic law preserves
state interest in sovereignty because the treaty does not impose
an international standard.47 At the same time, a defined mechanism for action fosters civil society interest in the environment.48
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Citizen Submissions Do Not Rely on a Government to
Initiate Treaty Enforcement Actions
Unlike state-to-state dispute resolution, the citizen submission process provides a venue for citizens to report instances of
non-enforcement in their own neighborhoods or in a protected
area used by the public.49 Citizens have an interest in protecting
the natural areas they use, and are
more likely to report a failure to
enforce than the government.50
Citizens can directly observe
environmental violations and
a lack of state action in their
neighborhoods.51 In contrast,
limited resources restrict state
monitoring of another state’s
enforcement activity.52 Citizens
and other private actors are also
better equipped to identify ineffective enforcement because
they are closer to violations.53

Citizen Enforcement Fosters the Development of a
Community of Environmental Activists
While the citizen submission process is theoretically accessible to the general public without legal assistance, this process
can be more successful when there is a civil society community ready to bring claims.63 At the same time, the process’ concrete avenue for action provides a
mechanism for environmental
organizations in more developed countries to work with
growing organizations in Latin
America.64 These connections
between environmental organizations foster the development
of the environmental community, strengthening domestic
environmental protections as
well as the citizen submission
process.65 Some criticize the citizen submission process because
it does not legally bind the government to take any action.66
However, even a limited citizen
submission process is a valuable
tool for environmental advocates to pressure government actors
to pursue environmental protection.67

Because citizen
submissions do not rely
on government action,
countries cannot subsume
environmental issues to
other diplomatic
concerns

Citizen Submissions Balance
State Sovereignty and Public
Interest in Enforcement of
Environmental Laws
Relying on citizen enforcement addresses the widespread
concern of Latin American countries that environmental provisions in free trade agreements are an effort to restrict their sovereignty with outside standards.54 The CAAEC’s requirement
to enforce domestic environmental laws allows a country to set
a level of environmental protection it feels is appropriate.55 At
the same time, as an environmental community develops, that
community can pressure the government to increase levels of
environmental protection and enforcement.56 States also see the
citizen submission as a lesser threat because of the absence of
trade sanctions associated with a factual record.57
Enforcement of domestic environmental law imposes lower
sovereignty costs on Latin American states.58 Because only citizens can initiate the submission process, the process does not
raise concerns of a lack of democratic accountability.59 As a
community of environmental activists develops, that community
can lobby for more protective environmental laws, making the
government more responsive to community concerns.
In contrast to the dispute resolution proceeding under the
USCFTA, the citizen submission process does not carry a direct
threat of trade sanctions and instead relies on the deterrent effect
of factual records.60 This limitation preserves the benefits of the
free trade agreement while providing consequences for nonenforcement of the terms of the agreement.61 The absence of
trade sanctions also prevents a state-to-state dispute resolution
from punishing exporters and other private parties who might
not have been involved in the state’s non-enforcement.62
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Recommendations
As long as the United States continues to expand free trade
with Latin America, free trade agreements should include a citizen enforcement mechanism. To ensure citizens have environmental laws to monitor, the United States should refrain from
signing agreements with states that do not have an effective
legal framework for environmental protection. While access to a
citizen submission process will not immediately provide effective environmental protection, it is an important step.

Include a Citizen Submission on Enforcement
Mechanism in Future Free Trade Agreements
While the CCAEC citizen submission process is weak
when compared to U.S. citizen suit provisions, the process is an
innovative mechanism in international law.68 Historically, private citizen action in the international arena was only available
through state action, but citizen submissions allow governments
to stay an arm’s length from the proceedings. States cannot
accuse other governments of manipulating the environmental
dispute resolution process for other purposes because the submission process does not involve government action.
A citizen submission mechanism harnesses the collective
knowledge of citizens to identify instances of environmental
non-enforcement.69 State interests in preserving sovereignty
would likely limit any effort for states to monitor each others’
domestic environmental enforcement.70 A citizen enforcement
mechanism balances the public interest in consistent enforcement and the state interest in sovereignty.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

At the same time, the CEC governing bodies should have
more freedom to prepare factual records without political interference.71 The practical consequences of a factual record are limited to public disclosure of state action, and the state can blunt
criticism of any absence of enforcement with future enforcement
action.72 Because treaties require enforcement of domestic law,
not of a politically unattainable international standard, governments should be able to effectively enforce their own domestic
law.73 Overall, a citizen submission process within a free trade
agreement can be an effective mechanism to improve enforcement of environmental laws if the CEC has the political freedom
to pursue factual records.74 A trading partner, however, needs
a basic environmental framework before increased enforcement
will increase environmental protection.

Do Not Enact Free Trade
Agreements with States
that Do Not Provide
for Environmental
Protection

the recent U.S.-Peru Agreement does not increase environmental protection.77 Peru has environmental laws, but those laws do
not meet the “high level” of environmental protection required
by the treaty.78 Trade agreements can foster increased environmental enforcement, but only if the partner country has effective
environmental laws. If increasing environmental protection is a
goal of the United States and other developed countries, those
countries should not sign trade agreements with countries that
lack legal environmental protection.

Conclusion
While inclusion of any environmental provisions in free
trade agreements is a step forward, lip service to increased
enforcement of environmental laws is not sufficient. Effective
enforcement of domestic environmental laws should be a standard condition of future U.S.
free trade agreements. Allowing
state-to-state dispute resolution
on environmental issues is not
sufficient to actually increase
enforcement because states
tend to rely on mutual nonenforcement when there are no
other consequences. A citizen
submission on enforcement process is much more effective at
increasing enforcement because
it takes advantage of, and even
increases, public awareness of
non-enforcement. While a citizen enforcement process alone
will not solve the world’s environmental problems, it is an important step towards increasing government accountability for effective enforcement of
environmental laws.

Effective environmental
laws must be in place
before a free trade
agreement can improve
their enforcement

While a citizen submission
process can increase effective
enforcement of environmental
laws, increased enforcement of
laws that do not exist cannot
protect the environment. While
some argue that free trade brings
increased prosperity that will
in turn increase environmental
protections, investor protection
provisions in free trade agreements are a threat to new environmental laws.75 Because of these
investor protection provisions, effective environmental laws
must be in place before a free trade agreement can improve their
enforcement.76
While the United States and Chile enacted the USCFTA
after Chile had achieved a high level of environmental protection,
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Hilary F. French, Costly Tradeoffs: Reconciling Trade and the Environ61 (1993) (arguing that the United States should use free trade agreements
to increase global environmental protection), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/877.
2 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. See also William J.
Clinton, Governor of Ark., Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, at
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, N.C. (Oct. 4, 1992) (calling for environmental and labor agreements with NAFTA), available at http://www.ibiblio.
org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c151.txt.
3 NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14, 15, 22.
ment
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Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 5, 1996, Can.-Chile, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
chile-chili/menu.aspx?lang=en [hereinafter CCFTA]; Canada-Chile Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, Can.-Chile, available at http://
www.sice.oas.org/trade/chican_e/Environ.asp [hereinafter CCAEC].
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Endnotes: Giving Power to the People: Comparing the Environmental Provisions of Chile’s Free Trade
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5

U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 19, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta
[hereinafter USCFTA].
6 See, e.g., Heather Corbin, Note, The Proposed United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 14
Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 119, 141–42 (2003) (arguing that free trade
agreements should be used to advance environmental protection standards). But
see French, supra note 1, at 51 (detailing the difficulties of reforming existing
trade agreements to address environmental concerns).
7 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 23.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 23.1.
8 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14–15; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14–15.
9 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1. A citizen is any “person or organization
residing or established in the territory of a Party.” Id. art. 14.1(f).
10 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 8. See generally Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Bringing the Facts to Light: A Guide to Articles 14 and 15 of
the NAAEC (2007) (providing information about the NAAEC process to the
public), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/Bringing%20the%20
Facts_en.pdf.
11 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.1. The
National Secretariat will forward a submission that:
(a) is in writing . . . ; (b) clearly identifies the person or organization
making the submission; (c) provides sufficient information . . . ; (d)
appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry; (e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in
writing to the relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the Party’s response, if any; (f) is filed by a person or organization residing
or established in the territory of a Party; and (g) includes, in the case
of submissions [regarding] Canada, a declaration to the effect that
the matter will not subsequently be submitted [under the NAAEC],
with a view to avoiding duplication in the handling of submissions.
CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1. While these criteria are largely procedural, the
CCAEC Council found one of four submissions to the CCAEC governing body
to be insufficient, and terminated the submissions. CCAEC Submissions Registry, http://can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry /Registry.cfm.
12 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.2; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.2. The Committee considers whether:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the submission; (b) the submission . . . raises matters whose
further study in this process would advance the goals of this Agreement; (c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been
pursued; and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass
media reports.
Id. Of the three submissions the CCAEC Joint Submission Committee has
considered, all three merited a response from the party. CCAEC Submissions
Registry, http://can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry/Registry.cfm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009).
13 See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere:
Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation to
the Americas, 33 Envtl. L. 501, 517–18 (2003) (describing Canada’s efforts to
constrain the citizen submission process and defend against preparation of factual records, but also its support of the citizen submissions process as a mechanism for calling attention to environmental enforcement problems in individual
provinces where the federal environmental agency does not have control).
14 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.2.
15 Id. art. 19.2.1(a).
16 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.1.
17 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.6. The USCFTA requires both parties to
accept comments and suggestions from the public and allow for a public committee to advise the parties in their implementation of the agreement. Id. art.
19.4.
18 Id. art. 19.6, 22.4. Either party can unilaterally initiate consultations. Id. art.
19.6.1, 22.4.
19 Id. art. 19.6.6.
20 Id. art. 22.5.2.
21 Id. art. 22.6.1.
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Id. art. 22.15. See also Jay V. Sagar, The Labor and Environment Chapters
of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement: An Improvement Over the
Weak Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and
the Environment?, 21 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L 913, 928–29 (2004) (describing
the USCFTA dispute resolution process in more detail). The fine goes to a fund
for environmental programs, including increasing environmental enforcement.
USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 22.16(4).
23 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 22.16(5).
24 See Jerry L. Anderson & Dennis D. Hirsch, Environmental Law Practice
71 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining the crucial roles of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, state environmental agencies, and environmental organizations in
the effective enforcement of U.S. environmental statutes); cf. Victor B. Flatt,
Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never Grown
Up, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 595, 596 (2004) (blaming the failure of the Clean Water
Act to bring about clean water in the United States on ineffective enforcement).
25 Cf. Guillermo O’Donnell, Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin
America: A Partial Conclusion, in The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America 303, 307–08 (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds. 1999)
(explaining that the “rule of law” means legal rules are applied consistently
without consideration of the power or status held by the subject of a proceeding). But see Laura C. Bickel, Note, Baby Teeth: An Argument in Defense of the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 815, 845–46
(2003) (arguing that the focus on enforcement is misplaced and suggesting that
a focus on environmental management would better achieve the stated goals of
the NAAEC).
26 See, e.g., French, supra note 1, at 32 (describing toxic discharges into open
ditches at three-quarters of the sampled factories in Mexico’s border region,
even though Mexico’s environmental laws were comparable to those in the
United States).
27 E.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1223 (1998)
(“In environmental law, consistent treatment is particularly crucial so that regulated entities believe they are competing on a level playing field.”).
28 See Håkan Nordström & Scott Vaughan, World Trade Organization,
Special Studies 4: Trade and Environment 57 (1999), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/envir_e/environment.pdf (concluding that income growth in
developing countries is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increased
environmental protection). But see Howard Mann & Monica Araya, An Investment Regime for the Americas: Challenges and Opportunities for Environmental Sustainability, in Greening the Americas 121, 130–137 (Carolyn L. Deere
& Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (explaining that some corporations have used
NAFTA’s investor protection provisions to lobby against and gain compensation for financial harm from domestic laws strengthening environmental protection).
29 See USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.4 (requiring “receipt and consideration
of public communications” on environmental matters that affect trade).
30 E.g., id., art. 19.2.3 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
empower a Party’s authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement
activities in the territory of the other Party.”).
31 See Philip M. Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International Regimes, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1127, 1153 (2006) (describing pressure on
the NAAEC governing body to limit the “independence and discretion” of the
body to prepare factual records as more submissions have challenged state failures to enforce environmental laws).
32 United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements Home, (2009) http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (providing the U.S. trade strategy to “create
opportunities for Americans and help to grow the U.S. economy”).
33 See Bickel, supra note 25, at 847 (explaining that states do not have an
interest in pursuing state-to-state dispute resolution because doing so would
highlight the accusing state’s own enforcement record).
34 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (2008) (delegating power over foreign affairs to
the Secretary of State in the manner in which the President directs).
35 USCFTA, supra note 5, preamble (providing that the United States and
Chile resolved to “AVOID distortions in their reciprocal trade; [and] ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade,” among
other goals).
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See Eric Miller, Did Mexico Suffer Economically from the NAFTA’s Environmental Provisions?, in Greening the Americas 121, 130–137 (Carolyn
L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (finding no economic impact from
trade sanctions because no party has ever used the sanction provisions of the
NAAEC); see also Blanca Torres, The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Rowing Upstream, in Greening the Americas 201, 207
(Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (describing the “lengthy” and
unlikely process of applying trade sanctions for environmental non-enforcement but saying Mexican officials still find the potential “threatening”).
37 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.
38 Id., art. 19.2.1(a) (providing that a state party must show that the accused
party has “[failed] to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the Parties”).
39 French, supra note 1, at 50–51 (praising the NAFTA dispute resolution
procedures for placing the burden of proof on the challenging state instead of
the defending state). Placing the burden on the challenging state makes environmental regulations more likely to survive a challenge. French, supra note 1, at
50–51.
40 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.2.1(a).
41 See, e.g., Special Report: Environmental Laws on the Books in Latin America But Enforcement, Environmental Infrastructure Lacking, 20 Int’l Env’t
Rep. 176, 176 (1997) (describing environmental enforcement in Latin America
as “uneven, sporadic, ineffectual, and sometimes, non-existent”).
42 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.2.1(a) (providing that a state party must
show that the accused party has “[failed] to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties”).
43 See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 27, at 1224 (explaining that companies
will hesitate to invest in compliance with environmental laws without effective
enforcement in fear that their competitors are not in compliance, thereby gaining a competitive advantage with lower costs).
44 Cf. Moremen, supra note 31, at 1154 (explaining that the complicated
NAFTA provisions for state-to-state dispute resolution makes the imposition of
trade sanctions “unlikely”).
45 See Id. at 1155 (speculating that developing states do not have to fear crippling numbers of submissions because there are few submissions and only real
sanction is “sunshine”).
46 See discussion supra (explaining that states generally have little incentive to
bring environmental enforcement claims against other states).
47 See French, supra note 1, at 55 (speculating that the Mexican government
would not agree to a side agreement to NAFTA that included U.S. enforcement
of environmental laws inside Mexico).
48 See Block, supra note 13, at 516 (remarking on the increased citizen participation in public fora in Mexico after the NAAEC); see also Torres, supra
note 36, at 210–14 (describing the strengthening of the Mexican environmental
community around the NAFTA negotiation process and rise in public interest in
environmental issues as the public became more aware of environmental monitoring data).
49 Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 734, 734–35 (1972) (holding that a
plaintiff must be a current user of a resource to have standing to bring a lawsuit
protecting that resource).
50 See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 389, 404–05 (2004) (explaining that citizens and
NGOs are more likely than a government to report violations because they are
close to the affected environment or specialize in identifying violations).
51 See generally id. (contrasting three citizen alert mechanisms: “police
patrols,” “fire alarms,” and government monitoring of treaty compliance; and
crediting the diffusion of information to the success of citizen monitoring
efforts and citizen suits under U.S. environmental law).
52 See infra (arguing that states concerned about sovereignty are also unlikely
to accept foreign patrols to identify ineffective enforcement).
53 See Raustiala, supra note 50, at 406 (explaining that private actors have
various incentives to report violations; compliant facilities have an economic
incentive to report violations by competitors, users of a natural resource have an
interest in preventing harm, and environmental NGOs have an interest in fulfilling their common purpose).
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See Benjamin Martin, Note, An Environmental Remedy to Paralyzed Negotiations for a Multilateral Foreign Direct Investment Agreement, 1 Golden
Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 209, 226 (2007) (explaining that developing nations have
hesitated to enter into investment and trade agreements that include human
rights and religious freedom conditions because they see these conditions as “an
unreasonable interference with state sovereignty”).
55 See CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 3 (allowing each party to “select its own levels of domestic environmental protection” as well as requiring a “high level” of
environmental protection). But see French, supra note 1, at 13 (explaining that
environmental regulations in one country can cause “massive degradation” in
other countries in the absence of global environmental regulations).
56 See French, supra note 1, at 57 (describing the European environmental
community’s increased involvement with enforcement when European Union
treaties provided for a citizen enforcement mechanism with little power to
impose penalties).
57 While a factual record could form the basis of a state-to-state dispute, there
have been no such disputes under the NAAEC or CCAEC, which makes that
possibility remote. John J. Kirton, Winning Together: The NAFTA TradeEnvironment Record, in Linking Trade, Environment, and Social Cohesion 74,
90 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. Maclaren eds., 2002) (contrasting the twentyeight citizen submissions with the absence of any state-to-state disputes in the
first six and a half years of the NAAEC).
58 See Moremen, supra note 31, at 1155 (explaining that the limited nature of
the NAAEC’s capacity imposes limited sovereignty costs, but any complaintbased procedure has a greater sovereignty cost than a state-dependent procedure); see also French, supra note 1, at 55 (describing Mexico’s concern with
the powers of an international governing body).
59 But see Raustiala, supra note 50, at 410 (arguing that relying on citizen “fire
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